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NOTES
THE RIPARIAN RIGHTS DOCTRINE
IN SOUTH CAROLINA*
I. INmToDucrio
With an expanding population and rapid development of the
state's industrial sector, new and greater demands are being
placed upon South Carolina's water resources. Although South
Carolina is blessed with a plentiful supply of water, many
problems arise in the disposition of this resource when such
rapidly increasing demands are superimposed upon an anti-
quated legal framework. The riparian doctrine of water law
adopted by South Carolina 130 years ago has been steadily los-
ing ground in its attempt to keep pace with the demands placed
upon it. In light of technological advancement and the popula-
tion explosion, the import of the gap between the capabilities
of the riparian system and the present needs of society becomes
apparent. However, this inadequacy of the riparian system has
been eclipsed by a reportedly "abundant" supply of water. For
how long can such "abundance" be taken for granted? Not only
does the system of riparian rights result in gross waste of a
valuable resource but it also culminates in the many inequities
suffered by the riparian proprietor. The individual and the
state are the losers.'
The introduction of the basic riparian concept into American
jurisprudence is attributed to Story and Kent. At one time the
doctrine was thought to have developed primarily from the Code
Napoleon 2 but recent scholars believe that the doctrine origi-
nated in the United States.3
*This paper was written as part of a South Carolina water law research
project funded by the Office of Water Resources Research of the Department
of the Interior, under a matching grant agreement with the Water Research
Institute of Clemson University. The School of Law of the University of
South Carolina is undertaking the research for the Institute.
1. See WATER PoLIcY CoMMITE OF THE GENERAL ASSEmBLY OF SoUTH
CAROLINA, A NEv WATER PoLicy, REPORT OF THE WATER PoLIcy COMMITTEE
SUBMITTED TO THE GENERAL ASSEmBLY OF SoTTH CAROLINA 9-12 (1954).
2. See Busby, American Water Rights Law: A Brief Synopsis of Its Broad
Trends with Special Reference to the Beneficial Use of Water Resources, 5
S.C.L.Q. 106 (1952); Lauer, The Common Law Background of the Riparian
Doctrine, 28 Mo. L. REv. 60 (1963).
3. RE STATEMENT of Torts, Explanatory notes § 850-64, at 342 (1939).
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The definition of riparian rights is elusive because of the
variety of factual situations to which the doctrine applies.4
At the risk of oversimplification the principal tenet of the
riparian doctrine is that:
[A] riparian proprietor is one whose land is bounded or
traversed by a natural stream [with such inherent rights
as the] right to the flow of the stream in its natural
course and in its natural condition in respect of both
volume and purity, except as affected by reasonable
use by other proprietors, the right of access to and use
of the stream or water . ...
Riparian rights include the rights of the proprietor in the banks
and beds of the water course as well as in the water itself."
The South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of
riparian rights in Omelvanq v. JaggerS7 in which it expressly
rejected the contention "that the person erecting the first mill
thereby acquired any superior rights"" (i.e. the doctrine of prior
appropriation).9 In considering whether the prior appropriator
or the upper riparian would prevail the court quoted at length
from Chancellor Kent:
Every proprietor of lands on the banks of a river, has
naturally an equal right to the use of the water which
flows in the stream adjacent to his lands, as it was wont
to flow ... without diminution or alteration. No pro-
prietor has a right to use the water to the prejudice of
other proprietors above or below him, unless he has a
prior right to divert it, or a title to some exclusive
enjoyment. He has no property in the water itself, but
4. 93 C.J.S. Waters § 5 (1956).
5. 56 Am. JuR. Waters § 273 (1947).
6. Shannonhouse, Some Principles of Water Law in the Southeast, 13
MERCER L. REv. 344 (1961), in SOUTHEASTERN WATER LAW CONFERENCE,
UnIvERsrry OF GEORGIA, 1961, WATER LAW AND POLICY IN THE SOUTHEAST6 (1962).7. 2 Hill 634 (S.C. 1835).
8. Id. at 640.
9. Basically water rights as determined under the doctrine of prior appro-
priation arise through the creation of a priority of beneficial use and not
through the possession of riparian lands. The southeastern states have general-
ly adhered to the common law riparian rights doctrine whereas the western
states have developed their own water law systems dependent upon their own
particular needs and requirements. In states such as California, there evolved
another line of thought which resulted in a somewhat inconsistent combination
of priority and riparian rights. See 6-A AISESICAN LAW OF PRoiERTv § 28.58
(A.J. Casner ed. 1954); Busby, Ainericgn Water Rights Law: A Brief Syn-
opsis of Its Origin and Some of Its Broad Trends with Special Reference to
the Beneficial Use of Water Resources, 5 S.C.L.Q. 106,117 (1952).
[Vol. 21
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a simple use of it while it passes along.... Though he
may use the water while it runs over his land, he cannot
reasonably [sic] detain it or give it another direction,
and he must return it to its ordinary channel when it
leaves his estate. Without the consent of the adjoining
proprietors, he cannot divert or diminish the quantity
of water which would otherwise descend to the proprie-
tors below, nor throw back the water upon the proprie-
tors above, without a grant, or an uninterrupted pos-
session of twenty years, which is evidence of it. 10
After its adoption in South Carolina, the riparian rights
doctrine evolved in the common law tradition of case by case
development. Since the rights of the land owner are dependent
upon the river, stream, etc. which flows through or by his land,
perhaps the best place to begin a discussion of the evolution
of riparian rights is with the concept of the natural water
course.
II. NATPUAL WATER CouisEs
A. Nature, (Iaasification and Ownership
Our court has defined a natural water course as follows:
To constitute a water course there must be a stream
usually flowing in a particular direction, though it need
not flow continually. It may sometimes be dry. It must
flow in a definite channel, having a bed, sides or banks,
and it naturally discharges itself into some other stream
or body of water. It must be something more than mere
surface drainage over the entire face of a tract of land,
occasioned by unusual freshets or other extraordinary
causes .... It is essential to the existence of a water
course that there should be a well defined bed or chan-
nel, with banks. If these characteristics are absent, there
is no water course, within the legal meaning of the
term; hence natural depressions in the land through
which surface water from adjoining lands naturally
flows are not water courses.
11
10. 2 Hill at 640, quoting from 3 KZNT'S Com. 353 (1928). As pointed out
in White v. Whitney Mfg. Co., 60 S.C. 254, 266, 38 S.E. 456, 460 (1901), there
is a serious misprint in the Omelvany quotation in that the word "reasonably"
has been substituted for the word "unreasonably."
11. Lawton v. South Bound R, 61 S.C. 548, 552-53, 39 S.E. 752, 753-54
(1901). In a fairly recent decision, Johnson v. Williams, 328 S.C. 623, 634, 121
S.E.2d 223 (1961), involving the issue of whether a drainway was a natural
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To assert riparia rights, it must first be determined whether
the water in question is part of a natural water course or merely
surface water.12 This basic distinction is important because if
the fundamental elements of a water course are not present, then
the water is generally regarded as surface water to which the
applicable law of surface water will apply. For example the
obstruction of the flow of surface water is not actionable in
itself, whereas the obstruction of the flow of a natural water
course is actionable, provided of course that the riparian owner
is able to show damages as a result of the obstruction.1
3
Once it has been established that a natural water course does
exist, then it must be determined whether the stream is naviga-
ble or non-navigable.1 The determination of navigability bears
directly upon the ownership of not only the water but also the
bed and banks of the water course. The waters and the beds of
12. Surface waters are defined as being:
[Waters of a casual and vagrant character, which ooze through
the soil or diffuse or squander themselves over the surface, fol-
lowing no definite course. They are waters which, though cus-
tomarily and naturally flowing in a known direction and course,
have nevertheless no banks or channels in the soil, and include
waters which are diffused over the surface of the ground ....
Lawton v. South Bound R.R., 61 S.C. 548, 552, 39 S.E. 752, 753 (1901).
In determining whether a natural water course exists, the courts consider all
of the factors present in each case. The above definitions are not all encompass-
ing but are used as guides with primary attention focused upon the presence or
absence of banks or a channel. As an example of the factors considered by the
court, it has been held that the presence of catfish in a drainway in which water
had accumulated did not conclusively prove that the ditch was a natural water
course. Rivenbark v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 124 S.C. 136, 117 S.E. 206
(1923).
13. See, e.g., Baltzeger v. Carolina Midland Ry., 54 S.C. 242, 32 S.E. 358
(1899); Edwards v. Charlotte & R.R., 39 S.C. 472, 18 S.E. 58 (1893). The
court in Johnson v. Williams, 238 S.C. 623, 121 S.E.2d 223 (1961), gives a full
discussion of the differences between surface waters and natural water courses
and the resulting legal consequences. Also, the Baltzeger and Johnson decisions
are discussed by Means, Property, 1961-1962 Survey of South Carolina Laow,
15 S.C.L. Rnv. 168, 170, 173 (1962).
An even more fundamental classification involves the artificial water course
as opposed to the natural water course. There is authority for the proposition
that riparian rights do not attach to artificial water courses. See 2 WAsH-
BURN, REAL PROPFRTY § 194 (6th ed. 1902). -For a discussion of the various
ramifications of this concept see Evans, Riparian Rights in Artificial Streams,
16 Mo. L. REv. 93 (1951).
14. It is not within the scope of this note to go into the various aspects of
navigability. The above textual statement is presented to briefly illustrate the
connection between navigability and riparian rights. However, brief statements
concerning navigability are deceptive in their simplicity in that they give no in-
sight into the multifarious problems which exists in the area of ownership of
lands between the high and low water marks. See note 15 infra. There are ex-
tended discussions of the various facets of navigability in Logan & Williams,
Tidelands it South Carolina: A Study in the Law of Real Property, 15 S.C.L.
REv. 657 (1963), and Horlbeck, Titles to Marshlands in South Carolina, 14
S.C.L.Q. 288, 335 (1962).
[Vol. 21
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tidal navigable water courses (navigable in the technical sense,
waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide) are the property
of the State ;15 however, such property is subject to the rights
of the Federal government 16 and riparian proprietors.17 The
beds of water courses navigable in the popular sense, but not
15. Woodbridge, Rights of the States it Their Natural Resources Partic-
ularly as Applied to Water, 5 S.C.L.Q. 130, 132 (1952). Although the beds of
navigable streams are owned by the state, there is a dispute over whether state
ownership extends to the high or low water mark. Dean Woodbridge cites
State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50 (1884), for the proposition that state
ownership extends to the high water mark. Woodbridge, supra at 139. How-
ever, in that case the main question before the court was whether the riparian
proprietor had any rights as such to the bed of a navigable tidal stream. The
court said that the bed-"soil lying below low water mark"-was held by the
state in trust for the public. Alhough the court discussed state ownership in re-
lation to the high water mark, that question was not properly before the court.
See State v. Pacific Guano Co., supra at 80-1. The subsequent decisions of Cape
Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 148 S.C.
428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928), and Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Pub.
Serv. Authority, 216 S.C. 500, 59 SXE2d 132 (1950), however, cast some doubt
on the vitality of the Pacific Guano holding.
In the Rice Hope case, in rejecting the contention that the state
has not such a servitude as the United States has in the bed of a
navigable stream, the court repeated the Cape Romain dictum
that lands between high and low water mark are held in trust by
the state; whereas beds of tidal navigable streams were clearly
and properly defined in the Pacific Guano case as "the bottom
proper" or "the soil lying below low water mark" so that the trust
referred to should not and does not extend to lands between low
and high water marks. The Cape Romain dictum was a funda-
mental departure from the Pacific Guano case.
Horlbeck, supra note 14, at 360; accord, Logan & Williams, supra note 14, at
666-67.
Another controversy arose over the ownership of marshlands adjacent to a
navigable river. The plaintiff established his chain of title from a grant by
King George II which made no reference to the low water mark. However,
the state stipulated that the controverted marsh was within the area delineated
in the grant, and therefore, rendered the question of ownership moot. Lane v.
McEachern, 162 S.E.2d 174 (S.C. 1968).
16. Thus while the states own their navigable waters this ownership
is subject to the commerce power, the war power, the proprietary
property rights, the treaty making power, the general welfare
power of the federal government, the doctrine of equitable appor-
tionment where the stream is an interstate one, to any inter-state
compacts that have been made as well as the rights of riparian
owners.
Woodbridge, note 15 supra, at 138. See Trelease, Federal Limitations on State
Water Law, 10 BurAxwo L. Rmv. 399 (1961); Baldwin, The Impact of the
Commerce Clause on the Riparian Rights Doctrine, 16 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 370
(1963). For a concise discussion of a riparian owner's "personal property"
rights in the water of a navigable stream versus the federal government's
dominant servitude see 9 S.C.L.Q. 293 (1957).
17. Jones v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 67 S.C. 181, 45 S.E. 188 (1903). The
court said that "[e]very riparian owner has rights with respect to a navigable
stream, in addition to his rights in common with the public to unobstructed
navigation. One of these is the right to have a free access of the stream over
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tidal, are owned by the riparian proprietors under South Caro-
lina law;"8 this is a minority position in the United States.
Although there is still some doubt as to the ownership of the
beds of navigable tidal waters, the ownership of the beds of
non-navigable waters and navigable non-tidal waters lies in the
adjoining properties.1 9 If the non-navigable water course forms
the boundary of a certain tract of land, the proprietor of that
tract owns the bed to midstream.20 If the proprietor owns the
land on both sides of the non-navigable stream, he owns the
entire stream bed in fee.
21
Some courts have defined the status of a riparian proprietor
with reference to the watershed of the stream, holding that land
which is not within the confines of a stream's watershed is not
riparian even though it is part of a larger tract that is con-
tiguous to the stream.22 South Carolina, however, has not so
defined the riparian owner. Our court places the primary em-
phasis upon the property being contiguous to the water course
and no consideration has yet been given to the watershed of the
water course.
Yet another unanswered problem in South Carolina in this
area involves the divisibility and severability of riparian lands
and the attendant consequences. It would seem that with the
emphasis placed upon contiguity, South Carolina would follow
the generally accepted line of cases which hold that the inci-
dents of riparian ownership are dissolved with the division or
severance of the riparian lands-where the conveyed property
is no longer adjacent to the water course.23
B. Extent of Right to Use of Water
General Considerations. The reasonable use doctrine was de-
veloped in "White v. Whitney Manufacturing Co.24 which quali-
fied the Omelvany rule25 as follows:
18. State v. Columbia, 27 S.C. 137, 3 S._. 55 (1887).
19. Woodbridge, supra note 15, at 139.
20. E.g., Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Can-
ning Co., 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 111 S.C. 87,
96 S.E. 714 (1918).
21. [1954-55] S.C. Avr'y GEN. ANNUAL REP. 218.
22. See Agnor, Ripari an Rights inr the Southeastern States, 5 S.C.L.Q. 141
(1952); see, e.g., Gonzales v. Arbelbide, 155 Cal. App. 2d 721, 318 P.2d 746
(1957). In Gonzates the court said that the status of a riparian owner was con-
tingent upon (1) land being contiguous to the water course, (2) land (smallest
tract) being under one title in the chain of title which leads to the present
owner and (3) land being within the watershed of the water course.
23. 93 C.J.S. Waters § 8 (1956).
24. 60 S.C. 254, 38 S.E. 456 (1901).
25. The court in White described the Omelvany definition as follows:
[Vol. 21
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The owner must so use and apply the water as to work
no material injury or annoyance to his neighbor below,
who has an equal right to the subsequent use of the
same water. Streams of water are intended for the use
and comfort of man; and it would be unreasonable and
contraxy to the universal sense of mankind to debar
every riparian proprietor from the application of the
water to domestic, agricultural and manufacturing pur-
poses [such uses would be subject to the prescribed limi-
tations in the Omevanzy rule], and there will, no doubt,
evidently be, in the exercise of a perfect right to the use
of the water, some evaporation and decrease of it, and
some variations in the weight and velocity of the cur-
rent... and a right of action by the proprietor below,
would not necessarily flow from such consequences, but
would depend upon the nature and extent of the com-
plaint or injury, and the manner of using the water.26
Moreover the court said that the right of redress depends upon
whether the use of the water is reasonable in relation to the
corresponding rights of the upper and lower riparian. The rea-
sonableness of the use is the test to determine the extent of the
right to use the water and the determination of reasonableness
must be made in light of the total circumstances. Factors to be
considered as attendant circumstances are the capacity of the
"This is the clear and settled general doctrine on the subject, and all the dif-
ficulty that arises consists in the application." 60 S.C. at 265, 38 S.E. at 460.
Later in the opinion Chief Justice McIver said, "the quotation from the case
of Omelvany V. Jaggers ... is misleading, as it takes no notice of the limita-
tion or qualification of the general rule .... " Id. at 270, 38 S.E. at 462.
26. Id. at 265-66, 38 S.E. at 460. Two theories concerning the right to use
water have evolved from the riparian rights doctrine-the reasonable use theory
discussed in the text and the natural flow theory.
Generally speaking. .. under the natural flow theory, a riparian
owner can take water for domestic purposes only, such as water for
the family, livestock, and gardening, and he is entitled to have the
water in the stream or lake upon which he borders kept at normal
level.
Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133 (1955). For a general
comparison of the two theories see 4-A AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 28.56-
.57 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954). By definition "[t]he natural flow theory is non-
utilitarian and prevents full beneficial use of valuable water resources." Id. at
§ 28.56. The South Carolina Supreme Court discussed the natural flow theory
in White saying that:
Such a rule could not be the law so long as equality of right be-
tween the several proprietors was recognized, for it is manifest it
would give to the lower proprietor superior advantages over the
upper, and in many cases give him in effect a monopoly of the
stream.
White v. Whitney Mfg. Co., 60 S.C. 254, 267, 38 S.E. 456, 461 (1901), quoting
from Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420, 423 (1874).
1969] NoTs
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waterway (size and volume), the adaptation of machinery to the
waterway, the necessity of use and the general usage or custom
of the locality.27 Each of these questions turns upon its own par-
ticular factual situation and is to be determined by the trier of
fact.
2 s
Domestic Purposes. Apparently there are no South Carolina
decisions in this area. The emphasis placed upon the use of
water for domestic purposes is considerably less in a state that
follows the reasonable use doctrine rather than the natural flow
theory. 29
Agricultural Purposes. It is generally felt that the diversion
of water by a riparian owner is permissible if used for irriga-
tion.3o Since there are no cases in South Carolina dealing spe-
cifically with irrigation, the extent of a riparian's right to divert
water for irrigation must be measured by its reasonableness. As
previously stated, the question of reasonableness is a factual
determination based upon the totality of the circumstances.31
The court in Jordan v. Lang3 2 considered the right to divert
water for irrigation but did so only within the confines of a
prescriptive right. Later the right was briefly discussed in an
attorney general's opinion concerning the appropriation of
waters from the Edisto River for irrigation and the procedure
for establishing an irrigation district.3 3 The attorney general
expressed his advice on the two questions presented as follows:
(a) [T]he fundamental principle of the system of
"riparian rights" is that each riparian proprietor has
an equal right to make a reasonable use of waters of
stream subject to equal right of other riparian pro-
prietors likewise to make a reasonable use.
27. See, e.g., United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir.
1966) ; White v. Whitney Mfg. Co., 60 S.C. 254, 38 S.E. 456 (1901).
28. E.g., McMahan v. Walhalla Light & Power Co., 102 S.C. 57, 86 S.E. 194
(1915); Griffin v. National Light & Thorium Co., 79 S.C. 351, 60 S.E. 702
(1908).
29. See note 26 Supra.
30. 30 Amr. JuR. Irrigation § 9 (1940); 4-A A.ncAzx LAw oF PROPERTY
§ 28.57 (AJ. Casner ed. 1954).
31. See Agnor, Riparian Rights it the Southeastern States, 5 S.C.L.Q. 141,
145 (1952).
32. 22 S.C. 159 (1885). In this case all of the water was withdrawn from
a ditch to cultivate rice, and was never returned. The defendant had main-
tained this diversion for 30 years, and the court allowed him to continue his
use on the theory that he had obtained a prescriptive right. The court said,
"It seems to us that the easement to use water for the purpose of irrigation
is somewhat analogous to that of backing water for mill privileges." Id. at 165.
33. [1945-46] S.C. Ar'v GEN. ANNUAL REP. 172.
[Vol. 21
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(b) The General Assembly has not, so far, declared
itself as to the procedure to be followed by those de-
siring to organize for the purpose of irrigation or to
engage in irrigation as a private undertaking. I feel
that it will take laws similar to those now in existence
as to drainage districts to authorize and outline the
procedure for organizing irrigation districts.34
The opinions of the attorney general and the court 35 are illus-
trative of the uncertainty inherent in the riparian system. The
prospective riparian user is afforded no assurance that capital
expenditures made to construct irrigation works will be pro-
tected. There is always the risk that a court will find his use
unreasonable with respect to present or future riparian uses.30
Commercial Purposes. Most of the South Carolina cases in
this area have involved questions of pollution. Generally these
cases have said that manufacturers are entitled to reasonable use
of riparian waters for industrial waste disposal. However, this
statement is true only to the extent that the polluting use does
not create a nuisance nor inflict substantial injury upon the
lower riparians.37
Owners of land on the banks of a stream are entitled
to the reasonable use of the stream; that they can use
the stream for their own purposes to a reasonable ex-
tent; that while it is true that a stream must not be
polluted, still this does not mean that nothing can be
34. Id. at 172-73.
35. The courts should not be criticised in regard to their decisions in this
area. Although they may not have handled the problem directly, they could
not act otherwise in light of the existing legal framework. To reach a dif-
ferent result here would involve a change in policy which would properly be
within the domain of the state legislature. See Murphy, A Short Course on
Water Law for the Eastern United States, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 93, 110.
36. Agnor, Riparian Rights in the Southeastern States, 5 S.C.L.Q. 141, 146
(1952). Professor Agnor proposes two alternative courses of action for the
proprietor who finds himself confronted with the problem presented in the text:
(1) purchase easements from the lower riparians; (2) use the water, and
litigate the matter. He says: "It must be concluded that the present status of
the law with regard to riparian rights in the Southeastern States does not per-
mit proper use of waters for irrigation, or at least practical use." Id.
37. See United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, 244 F. Supp. 895 (W.D.S.C.
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Lowe v. Ottaray
Mills, 93 S.C. 420, 77 S.E. 135 (1912); Griffin v. National Light & Thorium
Co., 79 S.C. 351, 60 S.E. 702 (1907) ; White v. Whitney Mfg. Co., 60 S.C. 254,
38 S.E. 456 (1901); [1959-60] S.C. ATr'Y GEN. AxxuLx. REP. 404. The rea-
sonable use of the waters from a natural water course governs the liabilities of
the user in that all riparian users, including industrial consumers, will incur
liability if the use results in the pollution of the waters to the extent that lower
riparian proprietors are injured.
1969]
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put in the stream; but that nothing can be put therein
that will deprive the Zandowners below to the reason-
able ue of the stream.8
The unreasonable polluting of a stream has consistently been
found to constitute a nuisance, and may be enjoined"9 where
damages are inadequate.
40
In addition to the common law protection of the individual,
38. United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, 336 F.2d 915, 919 (4th Cir. 1966)
(emphasis added), quoting from Duncan v. Union-Buffalo Mills Co., 110 S.C.
302, 306, 96 S.E. 522, 524 (1917). The court approved the above charge to the
jury.
39. Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S.C. 1, 66 S.E. 117 (1910);
Mason v. Appalache Mills, 81 S.C. 554, 62 S.E. 399 (1907) ; Threatt v. Brewer
Mining Co., 49 S.C. 95, 26 S.E. 970 (1897) (injunction as matter of right).
Contra, Note, The Trend-To Balance the Injuries, 4 S.C.L.Q. 540, 545 (1952)
(injunction granted as a matter of grace). See, e.g., Standard Warehouse Co.
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 222 S.C. 93, 71 S.E.2d 893 (1952). In Dill v. Dance
Freight Lines, 247 S.C. 159, 146 S.E.2d 574 (1966), the court refused to over-
rule the Williams case, and quoted with approval the following statement in
Williams dealing with the balance of convenience doctrine:
Whatever may be the doctrine in other States, under the provi-
sions of the Constitution of this State, that private property shall
not be taken for private use without the consent of the owner, the
Court could not have considered, in deciding whether to grant or
refuse the injunction, the question raised by the defendant as to
the balance of convenience, or of advantage or disadvantage to the
plaintiff and defendant and the public at large, for the defendant's
use of the stream.
Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S.C. 1, 7, 66 S.E. 117, 118 (1910),
quoted in Dill v. Dance Freight Lines, 247 S.C. 159, 162, 146 SxE2d 574, 575-76
(1966). These cases are discussed in Property, 1966-1967 Survey of S.C. Law,
19 S.C.L. R'v. 95, 97 (1967). The South Carolina court's reluctance to balance
conveniences is discussed in Note, The Trend-To Balance the Injuries, 4
S.C.L.Q. 540, 548 (1952).
There is still some confusion in this area, especially in light of the decision in
Johnson v. Williams, 238 S.C. 623, 121 S.E2d 223 (1961), which was not dis-
cussed in the Dill opinion. The Johnson court granted a mandatory injunction
to remove an obstacle from a natural water course and did so under the balance
of convenience doctrine. The court said that such an action was a matter of dis-
cretion. Also this case involved no public interest. For a discussion of whether
public interests and convenience are prerequisites to balancing see Note, The
Trend--To Balance the Injuries, 4 S.C.L.Q. 540, 545 (1952); Property,
1966-1967 Survey of S.C. Law, 19 S.C.L. REv. 95, 97 n. 17 (1967). The Johnson
case is discussed briefly in Means, Property, 1961-1962 Survey of S. C. Law, 15
S.C.L. REV. 168, 173 (1962), and the wisdom of the decisions preceding 1ohn-
son is questioned at 174 n. 15.
See Maloney, The Balance of Convenience Doctrine in the Southeastern
States, Particularly as Applied to Water, 5 S.C.L.Q. 159 (1952), in which the
author points out the flexibility achieved by combining the reasonable use doc-
trine with the concept of balancing conveniences.
40. The injunctive relief sought to terminate the abusive and negligent op-
eration of a waste disposal plant should extend only to the unlawful operation
of the plant and not to the total operation. See Dill v. Dance Freight Lines, 247
S.E. 2d 574 (1966) ; Conestee Mills v. City of Greenville, 160 S.C. 10, 158 S.E.
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the public is protected by statute.4' However, reasonableness of
use is still the basic test. The Water and Air Pollution Act
provides that:
Causes of action resulting from the violation of the pro-
hibitions contained in this chapter inure solely to and
are for the benefit of the people of the State and it is
not intended in any way to create new or enlarge ex-
isting common law or statutory rights for riparian
owners or others .... 42
In United States v. 53123 Acres of Land" it was decided
that:
An upper riparian owner may discharge waste into a
stream in South Carolina only so long as this does not
interfere with a reasonable use being made of the
stream by a lower riparian owner. The offensive use of
the stream may be terminated either by an owner
through common law remedies or the state through the
Water Control Board. Neither amounts to a taking of
property for which compensation must be paid. 44
Obstructions, detentions and diversions, whether for commer-
cial purposes or otherwise, are analyzed in the same manner as
all other uses-the common law standard of reasonableness.45
The legislature has also acted in this area but to a somewhat
limited and specialized degree. The South Carolina Code im-
poses a duty upon landowners to clean out their streams at least
twice a year and makes it a misdemeanor to obstruct the flow
of a stream through improper maintenance or otherwise. 46 Reg-
ulations are also provided for the backing up or overflowing of
41. S.C. CoDn ArN. §§ 70-101 to -139 (1962), as amended, § 70-101 et seq.
(Supp. 1968).
42. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 70-138 (1962). See Williams v. Pendleton, 244 S.C.
228, 136 S.E2d 291 (1964) (judge's failure to charge the above code section
constituted reversible error).
43. 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966), rev'g 244 F. Supp. 895 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
44. 19 S.C.L. Rsv. 286 (1967).
45. See, e.g., Hilton v. Duke Power Co., 254 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1958);
Standard Warehouse Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 222 S.C. 93, 71 S.E.2d
893 (1951) (diversion).
There is no doubt of the right of a riparian proprietor to divert the
flow of a stream while on his land, so long as he does not ma-
terially diminish or detain it and returns it to the lower riparian
proprietor through the natural channel.
Agnor, Riparian Rights in the Southeastern States, 5 S.C.L.Q. 141, 144-45
(1952).
46. S.C. Cone ANN. §§ 70-1 to -6 (1962), as amended, S.C. CoDE ANN. §§
70-5, -6 (Supp. 1968).
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waters by the erection of dams.47 Particular diversions by
riparian owners have been authorized, but these diversions have
been allowed only when they do not exceed eight per cent of the
stream's flow; also, the diversions must not interfere with exist-
ing reasonable uses.48 This legislation has been described as
moderate when compared to strong and limited regulation of
other states. 49
III. CONCLUSION
If the state is to keep abreast of the water requirements of its
rapidly increasing population and industrial complex, which
way is it to turn? To answer this question it is necessary to ask
three more: (1) Where are we now? (2) Where do we want to
go? (3) How do we get there?
In 1954 the South Carolina legislature considered but did not
pass, a proposal that the state adopt a system of prior appro-
priations in lieu of the existing riparian rights system. 0 Also,
the doctrine of balance of convenience apparently has been
rejected in this state even though "[a] sensible application of
the balance of convenience doctrine may be a very useful adjunct
in the development and application of the reasonable use
rule .... ."" Those statutes which have been passed in the areas
of pollution, obstruction and diversion, although still subject to
the common law riparian rights, are at least a step in the right
direction toward effective water management. The present
riparian rights system, however, results in considerable waste
because of the system's inability to effectively use the state's
water resources.
The state through its courts and legislature must decide in
which direction to go.
[Slome of the over-all goals might be to adopt, modify,
or continue such laws and other measures as will pro-
47. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 18-5 to -8 (1962).
48. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 70-471 to -491 (1962), as amended, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 70-475.1 (Supp. 1968).
49. Heath, Water Management Legislation in the Eastern States, 2 LAND
AND WATER L. REv. 99 (1967).
50. The proposed legislation is discussed in Ellis, Some Current and Pro-
posed Water-Rights Legislation in the Eastern States, 41 IowA L. Rzv. 237
(1956); Marquis, Freeman, & Heath, The Movement for New Water Rights
Law in the Tennessee Valley States, 23 TENN. L. REV. 797 (1955). The pro-
posed act is set out and explained in WATER POLICY ComM ITEE OF THE GEN-
EAL ASSEMBLY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, A NEw WATER POLICY, REPORT OF THE
WATER POLICY COMMITTEE SUBMITTED TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF SOUTH
CAROLINA (1954).
51, Maloney, The Balance of Convenience Doctrine in the Southeastern
States, Particularly as Applied to Water, 5 S.C.L.Q. 159, 171 (1952).
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mote the beneficial, efficient, and safe use, and con-
servation, of the available water supplies, and to help
develop any additional water supplies that may be
needed in different areas. A part of the problem in
developing any new legislation would appear to involve
questions as to how to provide sufficient certainty and
security in water rights to encourage desired invest-
ment, while also providing a legally sound, practicable,
and reasonably equitable system of water rights, and
a system sufficiently flexible to keep abreast of chang-
ing conditions.5 2
If change is to be limited to modification of the rules that make
up the riparian system as opposed to adopting a new system,
then the opportunities for uniform and flexible changes are
severely reduced. However, valid and effective choices are still
open to South Carolina. The effectiveness of the choices must
naturally depend upon the various needs-present and future-
of the state's economy.
Two alternatives in particular may be of benefit to South
Carolina, and both alternatives would draw upon the established
riparian base. The first alternative involves an extension of the
reasonable use doctrine 3 to permit a use, whether riparian or
non-riparian, to be maintained so long as it does not contravene
the reasonable use of others. Also under this proposal riparian
rights would be devisable and transferable. This extension of the
reasonable use doctrine would be consistent with the White
formulation 54 of the rule and there is no South Carolina pre-
cedent to hinder it.55 Moreover the new doctrine would greatly
increase the utilization of water in that nonriparians could
participate. Loosening the basic riparian standard would give
the existing statutes a more flexible foundation since these
statutes are subject to common law rights.
The second alternative would be to follow the path of states
such as California and Washington where there has been a
blending of the benefits of the appropriation system -with the
52. Ellis, supra note 50, at 263.
53. Marquis, supra note 50, at 833.
54. Note 26, supra.
55. Note 23, supra. It should be noted that there is a relationship between
the right of a riparian to sue a non-riparian user and the beginning of the run-
ning of the prescriptive period. In theory a non-riparian user can be enjoined
by a riparian user without a showing of damages.
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benefits of the riparian system.56 Under the "California" system
surplus water (water in excess of riparian needs) may be appro-
priated. Riparian rights are maintained in the base flowage. 57
Under the existing application of South Carolina law, the use
of water is spread so thinly among so many people that, gen-
erally speaking, no one can beneficially use it. Thus this valuable
resource is allowed to flow into the sea where it is lost and will
remain until an economical reclamation and distribution system
can be developed.
EDwARD P. Gumnwi, JR.
56. See, e.g., Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements in Riparian Doc-
trine States, 10 Bul'ALO L. REv. 448 (1961); Busby, American Water Rights
Law: A Brief Synopsis of Its Oriqin and Some of Its Broad Trends with
Special Reference to the Beneficial Ue of Water Resources, 5 S.C.L.Q. 106
(1952) ; Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams, 35 WASH.
L. Rzv. 580 (1960); Marquis, supra note 50; Trelease, Coordination of Ri-
parian and Appropriation Rights to the Use of Water, 33 TxAs L. REv. 24
(1954).
57. Marquis, supra note 50, at 834-35.
[Vol. 21
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1969], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss5/3
